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Introduction 
 
It has become commonplace to distinguish between altruistic and commercial 
surrogate motherhood. Altruistic surrogacy refers to cases where the surrogate mother 
is motivated by care or concern for an infertile couple, usually friends or relatives, to 
bear a child and then to transfer parental rights to them. Although she may be 
reimbursed for expenses associated with the pregnancy, she is not paid. Commercial 
surrogacy, on the other hand, is arranged through an agency which puts potential 
surrogates in contact with people wishing to employ their services. In addition to her 
expenses, the surrogate mother is paid a fee. Although both forms of surrogacy are 
morally controversial, the dominant view is that altruistic surrogacy is morally 
superior to, or at least less problematic than, commercial surrogacy. For example, the 
UK’s Brazier Report states a clear preference for unpaid surrogacy: 
 
4.36 – We believe that the core value here, on which many social 
arrangements in the United Kingdom are based, including blood and live 
organ donation, is the ‘gift relationship’. 
 
5.13 – In the UK, bodily parts may be donated only as a gift for which no 
payments are allowed. We believe that surrogacy should be informed by the 
same values.1 
 
Some segments of the medical profession openly support altruistic surrogacy 
arrangements within families as a way of treating infertility: 
 
                                                 
1 M. Brazier, A. Campbell & S. Golombok, 1998. Surrogacy: Review for Health Ministers of Current 
Arrangements for Payments and Regulation. Report of the Review Team. Cm 4068. London: HMSO. 
IVF surrogacy, when the commissioning woman has absolute infertility and 
the surrogate is a close friend or relative who has completed her own family 
and volunteers for altruistic reasons, possibly represents the most acceptable 
form of surrogate pregnancy, with minimal complications.2 
 
In South Africa, the Law Commission guidelines preclude payment of the surrogate 
mother, although the intending parents do pay reasonable costs such as travelling, 
maternity clothing, and any expenses relevant to the unborn child’s welfare. 
According to Dr. Thinus Kruger, head of Tygerberg Hospital’s unit for reproductive 
biology, surrogacy in South Africa is “an act of selfless love.” He says that women 
usually find their own surrogate mothers, either old and trusted friends or relatives, 
although occasionally the unit is approached by women who selflessly want to help 
childless couples. He notes that at Tygerberg, an average of one couple a month is 
helped through surrogacy, although the unit gets more requests than it can fulfil. Yet 
this shortage has not made Kruger supportive of paid surrogacy, which is likely to 
increase the number of available surrogate mothers. He emphatically states that 
“[surrogacy] must not become a money racket and no one in our programme is paid 
for being a surrogate.” The only reason offered for this view is that “it takes a very 
special woman to offer herself as a surrogate mother… They are one and all, loving, 
unselfish people.”3   
 
A quick consideration of the difference between a typical commercial transaction and 
a gift relationship provides some explanation for why the latter is thought by so many 
to be a preferable model for regulating and perceiving the relationship between 
surrogate mothers and commissioning parents. In its simplest form, a commercial 
relationship consists of two parties who have entered an agreement with each other to 
exchange a specific product or service in return for money. Both parties are motivated 
to enter the agreement by personal gain, and given that each has something the wants, 
both have some power to negotiate an agreement that is favourable to them. Buyers 
can ‘shop around’ to find the deal that best suits their wants or needs, whereas the 
seller is similarly free to advertise their goods and services in order to secure the best 
                                                 
2 J. Leeton, C. King & J. Harman, 1988. Sister-sister in vitro fertilization surrogate pregnancy with 
donor sperm: the case for surrogate gestational pregnancy. Journal of In Vitro Fertilization and 
Embryo Transfer 5: 247-248. 
3 D. Caelers, “Rent-free wombs a labour of love” The Star, April 10, 2001. 
price. The parties are usually free to enter the agreement, but once they have done so, 
their liberties are restricted in accordance with the terms specified in the contract: 
Each has a set of clearly defined rights and responsibilities, and neither has the power 
to renege on the agreement without incurring some penalty. Once the transaction has 
been completed, that is, when both parties have held up their end of the bargain, the 
relationship ends, neither party owing the other anything.  
 
By contrast, the kinds of exchanges that occur with a gift relationship are not 
motivated by personal gain but by care or concern for the other party. Such exchanges 
most often occur between friends or family members, but may also occur among 
strangers. The exchange is entirely voluntary: beneficiaries do not have a right or 
moral claim against their benefactors; benefactors do not have a duty to give: the 
giving is supererogatory – beyond the call of duty. In the case of ongoing donations, 
benefactors are both morally and legally free to cease donation at any time. 
Beneficiaries incur a ‘debt of gratitude’, but they are entirely free to determine the 
form the repayment is to take (for example, they may give a gift in return at a later 
time, maintain a friendly relationship, or simply say ‘thank you’). Relationships 
between parties to an altruistic exchange are typically more enduring and complex: 
although each party may have very specific expectations of the other, these are rarely 
made explicit. An unfortunate result of this is that friendly relationships between 
people often go sour, with one or both parties feeling that their expectations have not 
been met, or that, because of their kindness, they have been taken advantage of. This 
does not usually provide people with a reason to avoid such relationships, or to set up 
a clear list of demands and expectations. To do so would diminish the value of these 
relationships, which lies exactly in their voluntariness, in the knowledge that, for 
example, my friend is helping me because she wants to and cares for me.      
 
I take it as a given that the type of commercial relationship described above is 
inappropriate as a model for governing the relationship between surrogate mothers 
and intending parents. We certainly do not want to see potential surrogate mothers 
competing with each other to offer the best deal at the best price to infertile couples, 
(with women who wish to continue smoking during pregnancy perhaps offering a 
special discount to attract customers). However, I will argue that it is a mistake to 
assume that it follows from this that surrogate mothers ought not to be paid, and that 
the relationship between surrogate mothers and intending parents is best organised 
according to the norms of a gift relationship. Instead, I argue that surrogacy is best 
viewed as, and organised according to the norms of, a semi-profession, in that:  
 
1. Surrogacy is a vocation which is aimed at serving the public good. 
2. The surrogate mother is motivated by altruism or the good of others, yet 
receives a fee. 
3. The process is overseen, facilitated and regulated by an organisation or agency 
responsible for screening and selecting potential surrogate mothers, providing 
the necessary education and psychological support, and setting standards and 
expectations, with regards to both surrogate mothers and their clients.     
 
For the sake of simplicity my focus in this paper will be on cases of gestational (or 
full) surrogacy, which entail in vitro fertilisation (IVF) of the surrogate mother using 
the egg and sperm of the intending parents or donors. I will not consider genetic (or 
partial) surrogacy, which involves the insemination of the surrogate mother with 
sperm of the intending father or donor.   
 
Debts of gratitude 
 
It is uncertain whether acts of ‘pure altruism’, understood as acts of helping others 
without receiving any kind of reward, exist at all, for in most cases benefactors either 
are or expect to be rewarded by a sense of achievement, an enhanced reputation, and  
other immaterial rewards. However, there are many examples of altruistic acts where 
the benefactor does not obtain (or expect to obtain) any kind of material reward from 
the beneficiary (or a third party), such as making a (non-tax deductable) donation to a 
charity organisation, rescuing a child or animal from drowning, helping an elderly 
neighbour with their housework, and so on. We generally admire and encourage such 
acts of selflessness, but it should be noted that they typically occur within a 
relationship already characterised by material inequality, where the benefactor has 
much to give, and can do so at relatively little cost to himself, while by contrast the 
beneficiary is weak, poor, or otherwise disadvantaged. The benefactor may see 
himself as being in a privileged or advantaged position, as giving something back to 
the community, and thereby somewhat lessening the degree of inequality that exists 
between them. I would therefore argue that not all acts of selflessness, or non-
reciprocal altruism, are morally acceptable. In cases where the beneficiary is not 
worse off, all things considered, than the benefactor, and capable of giving something 
in return, I think most people would agree that it would be indecent for her not to. 
This is because beneficiaries incur a debt of gratitude, and this is so even if the 
benefactor makes it clear that they do not expect anything in return. In discharging 
this debt, beneficiaries are to some extent free to decide on the nature of the counter-
gift, but there are certain social and cultural norms that determine whether the 
counter-gift is appropriate and adequate in a particular situation. These norms involve 
the nature and value of the original gift, the means that the beneficiary has at her 
disposal, as well as the needs and desires of the benefactor. 
 
In the case of gestational surrogate motherhood, the following argument can therefore 
be made: To allow the infertile couple to have a child, to become parents, the 
surrogate mother undergoes a significant amount of pain and discomfort associated 
with IVF, pregnancy, and childbirth. She assumes a risk to her health, and some of the 
physical effects of pregnancy and childbirth are permanent. Her freedom with regards 
to diet and other life-style choices may also be significantly curtailed. To be sure, she 
is better off than the intending parents in at least one way, namely that she has the 
ability to gestate and give birth to a child, but she may not be better of overall. It 
would therefore  be indecent for the intending parents not to give something of 
considerable value in return if they are capable of doing so. As in other cases where 
beneficiaries incur a debt of gratitude, they should have some freedom to decide the 
size and nature of the counter-gift, but there seems to be no reason why, in principle, 
the gift could not be money.  
 
Against this some might want to argue that whereas non-monetary gifts may be 
appropriate, the moment that an exchange of money occurs we no longer have a gift 
relationship but a commercial one. And one reason why this is thought to be 
inappropriate in surrogacy is that it puts a price on something which has 
immeasurable value, thus reducing the value of women’s reproductive labour to a 
mere commodity.4  
 
In response I would argue that the mere fact that an exchange of money takes place 
between two parties is not sufficient for the relationship between them to be deemed a 
commercial one rather than one of reciprocal altruism, where one person performs a 
service or makes a sacrifice for another person who then reciprocates in some way so 
that the sacrifice of the provider is balanced by a corresponding service or sacrifice by 
the recipient.5 Money can be a gift, and indeed, in many instances money could be a 
better – more thoughtful – gift than something made or something bought. For 
example, when choosing birthday presents for one’s grandchildren, money may be 
good option, for it allows them the opportunity to choose something for themselves, 
which is something children often value very much. Thus it is not the exchange of 
money that turns the relationship into a commercial one – rather, it is the fact that 
both parties regard the giving of money as ‘full and final payment for services 
rendered’, and hence as the act whereby the client fully discharges his obligation 
towards the person who provided the good or service, thereby ending the transaction.  
 
A strong case can be made, then, for allowing intending parents to give money as a 
symbol of their gratitude, and as a way of reciprocating the surrogate mother’s great 
act of kindness. However, if our goal is to defend paid surrogacy, the ‘debt of 
gratitude’-argument doesn’t get us very far. It only shows that intending parents 
should not be prevented from giving some amount of money (or some other gift) as a 
token of their gratitude. This is a far cry from contending that surrogates ought to be 
paid a set amount for their services. Indeed, the debt of gratitude-argument seems to 
                                                 
4 Another reason given by some is that a surrogate mother who receives money is in effect selling the 
child. I will not deal with this objection here, except perhaps to note that if paid surrogacy amounts to 
baby-selling, then non-paid surrogacy amounts to giving away the baby as a gift, which seems 
objectionable for the same reason, namely that it involves treating the child as an object. For a good 
discussion of the objection that surrogacy commodifies children, see S. Wilkinson, 2003. Bodies for 
Sale: Ethics and Exploitation in Human Body Trade. London: Routledge. For the author’s views see 
Van Niekerk, A and Van Zyl, L. 1995. ‘Commercial Surrogacy and the Commodification of Children: 
An Ethical Perspective’ Medicine and Law 8.  
5 For an analysis of reciprocal altruism see Robert Trivers, 1971. ‘The Evolution of Reciprocal 
Altruism’, Quarterly Review of Biology 46: 35-57 and C. R. Badcock, 1986. The Problem of Altruism. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, chapter 1. For a general discussion of altruism from a moral perspective, see 
L. Blum, 1980. Friendship, Altruism and Morality. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
point against that conclusion, for a gift can only function as a token of gratitude if it is 
seen to be freely given.  
 
In what follows I give two arguments for why the norms of the gift relationship are 
inappropriate for governing the relationship between the surrogate mother and the 
intending parents.  
 
The argument from lack of freedom 
 
One attractive feature of the typical gift relationship is that the act of giving is both 
free and voluntary.6 It is free, in that no-one forces the benefactor to act as one, and it 
is voluntary, in that (a) the benefactor chooses the act of giving from a number of 
acceptable alternatives and, in addition, (b) is able to decide what to give and thus 
also how much of her resources to spend. In cases where the giving extends over an 
indefinite period of time, such as volunteering to read at the local library, or helping a 
friend in the garden, the benefactor is free to quit at any point. Continued acts of 
giving are – and must be appreciated as – voluntary act of kindness. The benefactor 
has a degree of power over the beneficiary, in that he can withdraw or cease his acts 
of kindness at any time, for example, if he were to suspect that the beneficiary no 
longer appreciates his kindness, or is taking advantage of him.  
 
In the case of altruistic surrogacy, the surrogate mother has much less freedom than 
the typical benefactor. In many cases unpaid surrogate mothers do not volunteer their 
services but are approached by an infertile couple. Given that she will know that they 
are likely to have exhausted all other means of having a child and that surrogate 
mothers are not easy to find, her available options will be extremely limited. Simply 
put, her choice is between becoming a surrogate mother and making the infertile 
couple happy, and not becoming a surrogate mother and possibly forever depriving 
                                                 
6 I follow Serena Olsaretti’s definition of voluntary action as one where there is an acceptable 
alternative, where ‘acceptable’ means conforming to some objective standard  (which Olsaretti 
suggests might be well-being). Freedom, by contrast, is defined as pure negative liberty: an agent is 
free to perform an action if there exists no preventing condition on their doing so. S. Olsaretti, Liberty, 
Desert and the Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 139. See also her ‘Freedom, 
force and choice: against the rights-based definition of voluntariness’, The Journal of Political 
Philosophy, 6 (1998), 53–78; and ‘The value of freedom and freedom of choice’, Politeia, 56 (2000), 
114–21. 
them of the prospect of having a child. And as Anleu points out, guilt may be more 
powerful than financial incentives as a means of making a friend or relative act as a 
surrogate mother.7 In addition, an unpaid surrogate is not free to decide what to give, 
or how much time, money or effort to put into the gift, for what the intending parents 
need and want from her is something very specific – her reproductive labour. They 
are also likely to expect her to follow a healthy diet and to refrain from enjoying 
alcohol and other substances that are potentially harmful to the child, to have the 
pregnancy closely monitored, and to include them in the whole process. The fact that 
she may happily do these things, the fact is that once she is pregnant she is not free 
not to do them. Finally, whereas benefactors are usually free to quit their acts of 
beneficence at any time, this is not true of a surrogate mother. Once she becomes 
pregnant, she has a moral – and possibly also a contractual – obligation towards the 
intending parents to remain pregnant and to hand over the child at birth. She may for 
some reason come to find the prospect of continuing with the surrogacy arrangement 
very unattractive, but the alternatives – to have an abortion or to sue for custody of the 
child – may be even less attractive or acceptable.  
 
In short then, whereas a woman may be more or less free to act as a gestational 
surrogate mother, once she is pregnant her freedom is curtailed in various ways, not 
by the intending parents or any other party, but by the fact that she now incurs a 
strong moral responsibility towards the intending parents as well as the unborn child. 
Following a healthy diet is no longer a gift or a favour that she can freely bestow on 
others, but a moral responsibility. The implication of this is that it is inappropriate to 
regulate the relationship between the intending parents and the surrogate according to 
the norms of a gift relationship. A further point that can be made in this regard is that  
were we to insist that the intending parents should be free to decide how to 
reciprocate her act of kindness – whether to give money, or gifts, an ongoing 
friendship or simply a sincere ‘thank you’ – there would exist a considerable 
imbalance in the amount of freedom that the two parties possess, which distinguishes 
it most other forms of reciprocal altruism. This leads us to a second argument against 
viewing surrogacy as a gift relationship, namely that it is unfair towards the surrogate 
mother. 
                                                 
7 S. Roach Anleu, 1990. ‘Reinforcing Gender Norms: Commercial and Altruistic Surrogacy’. Acta 
Sociologica 33, 1: 70. 
 The argument from fairness 
 
A woman who undertakes a surrogate pregnancy for altruistic reasons is much more 
vulnerable to exploitation and injustice than the standard participant in a gift 
relationship. This is not so much because she is a women, or may be disadvantaged, 
uneducated, or incapable of giving informed consent, as is sometimes argued. Rather, 
I want to argue that she is vulnerable to exploitation simply because of the nature of 
what she gives. 
 
When we give a gift or do someone a favour, we expect that our kindness will be 
reciprocated at some point in the future. We do not tell others this, not only because 
they ought to be aware of it already, given the norms of our society, but also because 
we want them to know that we are giving the gift because we care, and not as a means 
to a counter-gift. At the same time, we also want them to want to give us something in 
return because they care for us, and not simply because we pestered them into doing 
so or because they feel obligated to do so. Many relationships go sour because one or 
both parties feel they are receiving inadequate or no reciprocation, but because people 
generally give a series of small gifts and favours rather than one large one, neither 
party is likely to be seriously disadvantaged, or at least not for long, for they can stop 
giving at any time, or even end the relationship altogether. This process of reciprocal 
giving, together with the ‘exit option’, goes some way towards ensuring fairness and 
preventing systematic exploitation of one party by the other. 
 
In the case of unpaid surrogate motherhood, the surrogate mother may have various 
expectations of how the intending parents would or should respond to her great act of 
kindness. She may expect continued friendship, ongoing contact with the child or 
regular updates, or may expect to receive material goods, but she is unlikely to make 
her expectations explicit. One reason for this is that she may find it obvious and 
therefore insulting to suggest to them, for instance, that she expects them to support 
her throughout pregnancy, or would like to be included in their family as a special 
friend or second mother. Another reason is that, as suggested above, a gift or favour 
loses much of its symbolic value when it is a response to a request or demand rather 
than freely given, and this is especially so where immaterial goods such as friendship 
are at stake. Like other givers of gifts, her act of giving puts the surrogate mother in 
danger of disappointment and makes her vulnerable to exploitation. However, neither 
of the safeguards against injustice and exploitation that are typical of other gift 
relationships, exist: Her contribution does not consist of a series of small, independent 
gifts and favours, but of one big package, her reproductive labour, and she does not 
have the power to quit giving whenever she feels unappreciated. As noted above, once 
she is pregnant with the genetic child of the intending parents, she has a strong moral 
obligation towards them and towards the unborn child to continue to act in what that 
are beneficial to them.8 An additional factor that increases the likelihood of the 
surrogate mother not getting anything in return and thus being unfairly disadvantaged 
is the portrayal or surrogate mothers as selfless givers – as special women who expect 
nothing in return, which may be used by the intending parents as a justification for 
their failure to reciprocate.   
 
It can further be argued that, regardless of her motives and expectations, and even 
regardless of whether the surrogate mother is satisfied with the outcome, if she 
doesn’t receive a substantial reward in return then her act becomes one of self-
sacrifice and morally unacceptable for the same reasons that selfish acts are: Being a 
party to a self-sacrificing act, where the giver has nothing to gain and possibly much 
to lose from the act of giving, suggests that the beneficiary’s needs are more worthy 
than those of the benefactor. Acts of self-sacrifice enhance the position of 
beneficiaries to the detriment of benefactors and are to this extent exploitative and 
thus morally unacceptable.9 
 
Harm to children 
 
The arguments from lack of freedom and fairness point towards arrangements 
between intending parents and surrogate mothers where the responsibilities of both 
parties towards each other as well as towards the foetus or child are clearly outlined, 
and which includes a stipulation that the surrogate mother receive payment for 
                                                 
8 Interestingly, one UK study found that a significantly higher proportion of surrogate mothers who had 
a previous relationship with the commissioning couple were disappointed with the relationship after the 
birth and reported emotional or psychological difficulties in the year following the birth of the child. V. 
Jadva, C. Murray, E. Lycett, F. MacCallum & S. Golombok, 2003. Surrogacy: The Experiences of 
Surrogate Mothers. Human Reproduction 18 (10): 2196-2204.  
9 C.R. Badcock, 1986. The Problem of Altruism. Blackwell: Oxford. 
services rendered. There have been various objections to paid surrogacy, for instance, 
that it involves commodification of children10 and exploitation of women, but in this 
paper I will assume that adequate responses can be given to these objections and will 
instead focus on a different objection, namely that surrogate mothers who are 
motivated by money are more likely to put the unborn child’s health at risk than 
women who are motivated by altruism, and that altruistic surrogacy is therefore 
preferable to paid surrogacy. I argue that this argument may apply to commercial 
surrogacy, where the surrogate mother is motivated solely or primarily by profit, but 
that it is not valid for all cases of paid surrogacy. I argue in favour of viewing 
surrogate motherhood as a semi-profession, and of organising the relationship 
between surrogate mothers and intending parents along the same lines as those that 
exist between professionals and their clients.  
 
It has been suggested that a potential problem with surrogate motherhood is that 
women may tend to distance themselves from the unborn baby, given their belief that 
the child they carry is not theirs, and that such detachment may make them more 
likely to put the unborn child’s health at risk. While this could be a factor in all 
surrogacy arrangements, it could be argued that it is more of a problem with paid 
surrogacy. Since the intending parents cannot control all of the surrogate’s dietary and 
life-style choices before conception and during the pregnancy, they have no 
alternative but to put their trust in the surrogate mother, and unpaid surrogates are 
more likely than paid surrogates to be trustworthy. Unpaid surrogate mothers care for 
and have an intimate bond with the intending parents, and this is what motivates them 
to do all they can to protect the welfare of the unborn child. By contrast, the argument 
continues, paid surrogates are motivated by money rather than by altruism, and are 
therefore more likely than unpaid surrogates to put the unborn child’s health at risk, 
and less likely to follow a diet and life style that is optimal to the child’s welfare.   
 
In response to this argument, let us begin by accepting that it is true that people who 
are motivated solely by money to perform a certain task will tend not to put extra 
effort into doing it well unless there is a monetary incentive for doing so. This is not 
                                                 
10 See R. Macklin, 1996. What is Wrong with Commodification? In C. B. Cohen, ed. New Ways of 
Making Babies: The Case of Egg Donation. Indiana University Press; M. J. Radin, 1996. Contested 
Commodities: The Trouble with Trade in Sex, Children, Body Parts and Other Things. Cambridge, 
MA. Harvard University Press. 
thought to be a problem in business ventures where the sole aim is to make a profit, as 
long as the desire for money is coupled with a healthy respect for the law. However, 
there are many roles or occupations where, in order for someone to perform well, he 
or she has to value the goods internal to the practice as ends in themselves, rather than 
as a means to making money. Examples of such occupations include nursing, 
teaching, lecturing at a university and serving as a fire-fighter or on the police force. It 
certainly does not follow that people who perform these roles should not be paid. For 
example, we do not conclude from the fact that nurses who care about the welfare of 
others are likely to do a better job than those who are ‘simply in it for the money’, that 
they should not be paid at all, or should only be reimbursed for their expenses. 
Payment does not preclude altruistic motivation. Most (if not all) nurses would not 
(and could not, given the need to earn an income) choose a nursing career were it not 
for the fact that they will be paid for their services, but this does not mean that money 
is their main motive for choosing a nursing career and that they are not in the first 
instance motivated by genuine altruism. I would argue that an act of giving can be 
motivated by genuine altruism even if it is conditional upon receiving something in 
return, as long as the giver does not profit from the exchange. Indeed, as Culyer notes, 
monetary benefits may induce altruistic behaviour that would otherwise be 
constrained if the full cost were on the donor.11 
 
In the same way, in the case of surrogacy it could be argued that even though it may 
be true that altruistically motivated women will tend to be better surrogate mothers 
than women who are motivated (solely or mainly) by money, it does not follow that 
surrogate mothers should not be paid at all, or only be reimbursed for their expenses. 
Although we can safely assume that more women will be attracted to paid surrogacy 
(if it were legal and well-regulated) than to unpaid surrogacy, it is a mistake to think 
that these women will be primarily motivated by money rather than by altruism. I 
therefore propose that surrogate motherhood as a semi-profession, insofar as surrogate 
mothers perform a service aimed at the public good, and are motivated to do so by 
altruism, yet expect to receive compensation for their services.  
 
                                                 
11 A. J. Culyer, 1973. Quids without Quos – A Praxeological Approach. In A. Alchian et. al, The 
Economics of Charity: Essays on the comparative economics and ethics of giving and selling, with 
applications to blood. London: Institute of Economic Affairs, pp. 33-61.   
A possible objection to this proposal is to argue that surrogate motherhood differs in 
important ways from professions such as nursing and teaching, that combine to 
increase the risk to unborn children. One such difference is that members of 
professions receive extensive education and training, and have to pass certain tests or 
examinations in order to be admitted to the profession. In addition, people who 
choose a profession such as nursing or teaching have many other options, so that we 
may safely assume that if they valued money above all else they would have chosen a 
different occupation. What attracts people to these occupations is that they involve 
activities that are valuable in themselves, and not simply as a means to financial 
reward. By contrast, one might argue, women who become paid surrogates, like 
people who sell, say, their blood or sexual services, may not be (or be able to become) 
fit or qualified for any other ‘occupation’. These activities are unpleasant, 
uncomfortable, and degrading, so that only people who desperately need the money 
would choose to participate in them. This brings us back to the question, mentioned 
earlier, of whether the choice to become a paid surrogate is fully voluntary, but now 
the claim is not that a lack of acceptable alternatives is problematic in itself, but rather 
that we don’t want women who have few acceptable alternatives to become surrogate 
mothers, for they are unlikely to be reliable or to do a good job.12  
 
This argument depends on the truth of a number of empirical claims, which I cannot 
fully establish here. However, a few comments are in order. First, surrogacy agencies 
do and should screen women, both in terms of their physical health as well as their 
psychological state, to establish whether they will be suitable surrogate mothers. 
Second, although most women are able to become pregnant and have a baby without 
any kind of education or training, the same is not exactly true of gestational 
surrogacy, which may require repeated cycles of IVF, will have various implications 
for the woman’s welfare in terms of her relationship with her partner, her other 
children, and society in general, and will thus be psychologically much more 
demanding than other pregnancies. The kinds of information and psychological 
support needed by surrogate mothers are best provided by an specialist body or 
                                                 
12 This argument is similar to Richard Titmuss’s argument against commercial blood donation, namely 
that market oriented supply systems often draw blood from lower class, unemployed males, who, 
needing money, have a reason to donate frequently and to conceal their medical history. This increases 
the risk of transmitting infectious disease. Given that it is not possible to test blood for all infectious 
diseases, truthfulness in the donor is the only known way to avoid the risk of infecting the receiver. See 
R. M. Titmuss, 1970. The Gift Relationship. London: George Allen & Unwin, ch. 8.  
organisation. Further, and regardless of the inherent difficulties with being a surrogate 
mother, it appears that there are many women who find the prospect of helping a 
childless couple valuable in itself, and this (arguably) makes it very different from 
selling sexual services. Various studies of the motives of paid surrogate mothers have 
shown that contrary to popular belief about money as a prime motive, women say that 
they choose to bear children for others primarily for altruistic reasons. Although 
financial reasons may be present, very few women mention money as their main 
motivator. Instead, they mention empathy for childless couples, helping others 
experience the joy of parenthood, doing something special and thereby gaining a 
sense of achievement or enhancing their self-esteem.13 In this regard they are very 
much like school teachers and nurses who attach value to the activity in itself rather 
than simply as a means to making money.  
 
Finally, we can conclude that the harm-to-the-foetus argument supports limiting 
payment to surrogate mothers, rather than an outright ban, so that it is high enough to 
entice potential altruistic surrogates to supply their gestational services but low 
enough to ensure that only women with some degree of altruism are attracted to 
surrogacy. However, it must be admitted that the argument possibly has more force in 
developing countries that have high rates of unemployment and offer few alternative 
ways of making a living, with the result that there may be a greater risk that women 
who are attracted to surrogacy will primarily be motivated by payment rather than 
altruism. This risk is further increased by high rates of HIV and other communicable 
diseases in some developing countries, so that government restrictions on paid 
surrogacy may well be justified from this perspective. Although I agree with 
Wertheimer that it would be unjust – ‘adding  insult to injury’ – to deny poor women 
the opportunity to improve their overall welfare by embarking on a surrogacy 
arrangement, on the grounds that a decision between poverty and surrogacy is not 
fully voluntary, I believe the ‘harm to the child’-argument can justify such a 
restriction. 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 J. C. Ciccarelli & L. J. Beckman, 2005. Navigating Rough Waters: An Overview of Psychological 
Aspects of Surrogacy. Journal of Social Issues, vol. 61, No. 1, pp. 21-43.  
